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STATEM!'.NT OF THE CASE
Kature of the Case
The

calculated to

not to

Its

is to

compel respect for the constitutional guaranty m the onh effectively available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it.

Brown v. Texas, 422 U.S. 590. 599-600 (1975)).

Because of this, the Idaho Supreme Court in 5itate v. Page, 140 Idaho 841 (2004), "expressed its
disapproval of a rule that would allow lmv enforcement officers ·the ability to initiate consensual
encounters \Vith pedestrians in order to seize identification and run a warrants check.,.. State v.

Bigham, 141 Idaho 732, 735 n.2 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Page. 140 Idaho at 845).
Yet that is precisely what happened here. Two Nampa police officers illegally detained
Matthew Elliot Cohagan, after realizing that he was not a suspect that they had been looking for,
to check Mr. Cohagan for outstanding warrants which would allow them to lawfully arrest him
on the spot. The State then used those warrants to shield the officers from their illegal actions
and introduce the illegally-obtained evidence against Mr. Cohagan. Because the evidence seized
was a direct result of the Fourth Amendment \ iolation in this case. it must

suppressed. This

Court should vacate Mr. Cohagan· s judgment of conviction and reverse the order denying his
motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedint!s
The district court made the follov,ing findings of fact:
On February 26, 2014, shortly after noon. Officer Marvin Curtis of the
Nampa Police Department came into cnntact with the defendant, Matthevv Elliot
Cohagan. He and Officer Otto vvere driving southbound on 12th A venue South
and Officer Curtis testified that he saw the defendant standing on the south\vest
comer of 12th A venue South and 7th Street South in Nampa, Idaho. Officer
Curtis thought that the defendant resembled another individual[, Milo Morgan,]
who had an outstanding arrest warrant To further check this out, Curtis and Otto

turned around to get a better look at the defendant However, by the time they
drove through the intersection, the defendant had entered the Albertson's grocery
store on 12th Avenue and 7th Street in Nampa, Idaho.
The officers entered the Albertson's store and Otto made first contact \vith
the defendant inside. According to Curtis. Otto asked for his identification and
the defendant complied. His identification showed that he was Matthew Elliot
Cohagan and not the individual that Curtis believed he resembled. After this
consensual contact, both officers left Albertson's. Before they left the parking lot.
Curtis testified that dispatch or another officer wanted them to go back into
Albertson's to obtain surveillance video for an unrelated incident. He stated that
while Otto went to obtain the video, he went to find the defendant because he
wanted to confirm Otto's identification of the defendant. Curtis felt that the
defendant may have given Otto a fake identification so he wanted to confirm for
himself that the defendant was not the individual that he initially believed him to
be. Curtis found the defendant shopping in one of the aisles. At the outset of this
encounter, Cmiis activated his lapel video camera and recorded his contact with
the defendant.
The video was admitted into evidence as Exhibit No. 1. According to the
video, Curtis approached the defendant and asked for the defendam·s name and
his identification. The defendant handed his identification to Curtis. Curtis told
the defendant that he resembled another man that the officers were looking for.
Curtis then asked the defendant if he had any outstanding vvarrants. The
defendant stated that he did not and told Curtis that Officer Otto had already
spoken with him. Curtis replied, '"Ld me check if you have don't any \varrants."
Curtis also told the defendant to keep his hands out of his pockets. Then Curtis
asked defendant a second time if he had any outstanding warrants. During the
entirety of this contact and questioning of the defendant, Curtis hdd onto the
defendant· s identification.
While Officer Curtis waited for dispatch to respond to the warrant check,
the defendant asked if he could continue shopping. Curtis told the defendant that
he could but seconds later, he quickly caught up to the defendant and told him to
walk vvith him to the front of the store and to relax. At this time in the video,
dispatch still had not confirmed v,-hcther or not the delendant had any warrants.
While walking to the front of the store. the defendant placed his hands in his
pockets. Officer Curtis reached out and grabbed the defendant's arm and told
him to keep his hands out of his pockets. The defendant stated, .. Listen, I'm
gonna ask you please don't do this in the store." Curtis replied by again telling
the defendant to keep his hands out of his pockets. At this point it is evident
from the video that dispatch still had not confirmed any warrants.
On the video. Curtis. Otto and the defendant stood inside Albertson's at
the front of the store and waited until the warrants were confirmed. As the three
men walked out of the store, the defendant started walking faster and Otto told the
defendant, "You don·t want to do this in the store." On the video, it appears that
dispatch confirmed the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant. While still
inside the store, Curtis told the defendant to put his hands behind his back and
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told the defendant that he was under arrest. As they exited the store, the video
reveals yelling and an obvious struggle before the video shuts off
Curtis testified that there ,vas indeed a struggle as the three men left the
store and his lapel camera was knocked off. Curtis stated that the struggle started
when the defendant attempted to get away from them so Curtis tripped the
defendant and all three men went down to the ground just outside the front doors
of the grocery store.
Officers were able to handcuff the defendant. During the search incident
to arrest, officers discovered a yellow box containing a glass-smoking device with
white crystal residue that tested positive for methamphetamine. According to the
Probable Cause Affidavit, inside the box was a bag that contained 2.3 grams of
methamphetamine.
(R., pp.63-64 1); see also 5/6/14 Tr., p.9. L. I

p.32, L.4 (testimony of Officer Curtis): R., pp.57-

59 (Mr. Cohagan 's affidavit in support of his motion to suppress).)
After the State charged Mr. Cohagan with possession of methamphetamine (R., pp.2425). Mr. Cohagan filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of his unlawful
detention (R., pp.38--40). In response, the State admitted that Ofiicer Curtis illegally seized
Mr. Cohagan ,vhen he kept his license to run a -warrant check. (R., pp.49-51.) However, the
State claimed that any resulting taint was cured when Ofiicer Curtis learned of the outstanding
\Varrants. (R., p.51.) The State relied on the attenuation doctrine outlined in State v. Page.
140 Idaho 84 L 846 (2004), which instructs courts to look at .. (1) the elapsed time between the
misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence. (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances,
and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper lmv enforcement action."
At the hearing on the motion to suppress. Mr. Cohagan admitted that the discovery of the
outstanding warrant amounted to an intervening cireumstance. (5/6/14 Tr., p.35, Ls.12-17.) But

With just one exeeption, Mr. Cohagan does not ehallenge the distriet eourt's findings of fact.
As discussed in detail below, Officer Curtis knew that Mr. Cohagan was not the suspect the
officers were looking for before Officer Curtis asked him for his license. (5/6/14 Tr., p.28, Ls.212 (Officer Curtis testifying that "as [Mr. Cohagan] got close, maybe 10 or 15 feet away, I
realized it was not him [the suspect], but at that point I still wanted to ask his name and ID him''.)
1

he argued that the extremely short lapse of time between the unlmvful seizure and the arrest, as
well as the flagrancy and purpose of the unlawful stop, stood against attenuation.

(5/6/14

Tr., p.35, Ls.1-11. p.35, L.18 - p.38, L.2.) The State, on the other hand, argued that the short
lapse of time favored attenuation. (5/6/14 Tr.. p.39, L.24 - p.40. L.8.)
The court denied Mr. Cohagan's motion. (R., pp.62-67.) The court began by explaining:
It is undisputed that the officers· conduct in this case created an unlawful
detention. This Court also believes that their conduct created an unnecessary risk
to the defendant, to law enforcement officers, and to the community. The
officers' decision to enter the sture and detain the defendant created an
unnecessarily tense situation that could have elevated to a much bigger conflict.
There does not appear to be any reason that the officers could not have run a
warrant check and confirmed the existence of the arrest \rnrrant outside of the
grocery store and before they made contact with the defendant Additionally,
there appeared to be no reason why the officers could not have waited until the
defendant \Valked outside of the grocery store before approaching him and made
sure they were away from the store· s patrons. Their enthusiasm to confirm an
arrest warrant in a grocery store created an unlawful detention and an unnecessary
risk of harm that could have been avoided.
(IL p.65.) The court went on to address the State's argument that the officers' discovery of the

outstanding warrant was an intervening event that cured the taint of the officers' illegal actions:
[T]here \Vas a minimal lapse of time hetv,een the seizure of the license and the
discovery a [sic] valid arrest \Varrant. As to the flagrancy and purpose of the
improper law enforcement action, Officer Curtis testified extensively that the
individual resembled another suspect ,vho he knew had an outstanding arrest
warrant. While this Court finds the officers' conduct in the grocery store
unnecessary and that an unlawful detention occum.:d, the discovery of an
outstanding warrant was clearly an intervening factor between the unlawful
seizure and discovery of the evidence. . . . It is this intervening factor which
permitted the officers to arrest the defendant and conduct the search incident to
arrest.
(R., pp.66-67.)
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Mr. Cohagan later entered into a binding AlforcP plea agreement for possession of
methamphetamine. reserving his right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress.

(R., pp.108-114. 156-59; 9/18/14 Tr.; 2/19/15 Tr.)

Consistent with the plea

agreement, the district com1 sentenced him to serve seven years, with three years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.157, 168-70.) Mr. Cohagan timely appealed. (R., pp.171-73.)

2

North Carolina v. A(lord, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
5

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Cohagan' s motion to suppress because the evidence
seized was the direct result of the illegal dekmion?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When ft Denied Mr. Cohagan's Motion To Suppress Because The
Evidence Seized Was The Direct Result Of The Illegal Detention

A

Introduction
The district court erred in denying

. Cohagan's motion to suppress. The evidence

seized was not attenuated from Officer Cunis· illegal detention of Mr. Cohagan-it vvas in fact
the direct result of the illegal detention

Officer Curtis detained Mr. Cohagan so that he

could run a \varrant check with Mr. Cohagan present.

Because the vay purpose of the

exclusionary rule is to deter this type of police misconduct, the Court must suppress the
evidence.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. This Court accepts the trial

court's findings of fact if they are supported

substantial evidence, bm freely reviev,s the

application of constitutional principles to

Srate v.

140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004)

(citing State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159. 161 (2000)).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Cohagan's Motion To Suppress Because
The Evidence Seized Was The Direct Result Of The Illegal Detention
The Fourth Amendment protects the people's right to be free from unreasonable searches

and seizures. U.S. CONST., amend. IV; see

ID. CONST., art. L § 17; ivfapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.

643, 655 (1961) (the Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).

Evidence that the State obtains in violation of the Fourth

Amendment is generally excluded from a prosecution of the victim of the violation.
140 Idaho at 846: Wong Sun v. United

l U.S.

7

Page,

1, 484-85 (1963). This rule applies to

evidence obtained directly from the illegal gon:rnment action and evidence discovered through
the exploitation of the original illegality. !'age. 140 Idaho at 846: Wong S1111, 371 U.S. at 48485.

Once a defendant makes a showing that the evidence to be suppressed was casually

connected to the illegal state action, the burden shifts to the State to show that the unlawful
conduct did not taint the evidence. State v. C·ardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 908-09 (Ct App. 2006).
"·[T]he ultimate question is whether the police acquired the evidence from 'exploitation of
[the] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishahle to be purged of the primary
taint."' State v. Bighwn. 141 Idaho 732. 734

(Ct.

App. 2005) (quoting United States v. Green,

111 F.3d 515. 520 (7th Cir. 1997). and Wong S'zm. 371 U.S. at 488).

For example, the

attenuation doctrine "·permits use of cvidcnCL' that would normally be suppressed as fruit of
police misconduct if the causal chain betvvcen the misconduct and the discovery of the evidence
bas been sufficiently attenuated.'' Bigham. 141 Idaho at 734. The Idaho Supreme Court in Page
stated that courts consider the follcrning tlm:e factors to determine whether the attenuation
doctrine applied: ·'(l) the elapsed time b..:twl..'en the misconduct and the acquisition of the
evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances. and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of
the improper law enforcement action:· Page. 140 Idaho at 846 (citing Green, 111 F.3d at 521
and Brown v. Texas, 422 U.S. 590. 603-04 ( 1975)).
Here, the balance of these three factors shows that ·"the police acquin:d the evidence from
exploitation of [the] illegality,'' not .. by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint:' Bigham, 141 Idaho at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although the

officers' discovery of Mr. Cohagan's outstanding \Varrant acts as an intervening event, the other
two factors-lapse of time and flagrancy and purpose of the improper lmv enforcement actiontip the balance against attenuation. See id at 734-35 (citing Page for the proposition that "[t]he
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discovery of a \Varrant satisfies only the seconJ prong by showing an inten <.::ning circumstance.
The other factors, particularly ·the flagranq and purpose of the improper law enforcement
action.· must be weighed in every case to determine whethcr the taint of that misconduct is
sufficiently attenuated."). The district court erred by denying I\lr. Cohagan·s motion to suppress.

I.

The State Failed To Present Evidence On. And The District Court Failed To
Consider. The First Factor In The Analysis-The Lapse Of Time Between The
Misconduct And The Acquisition Of Evidence

The relevant time period for the first factor is '·the elapsed time bet\wen the misconduct
and the acquisition of the evidence."

Page, 140 Idaho at 846 (emphasis added): see also

Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-05 ("The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession" is
relevant "Brown's first statement was separated from his illegal arrest by ll..'ss than two hours,
... [ajnd the second statement was clearly the result and the fruit of the first.''); State v.
Reynolds·, 146 Idaho 466. 474 (Ct. App. 2008) (.. The first of th\.' three factors to be considered is
the lapse of time between the police misconduct and [a third party's] consent In this case, that
time period was very brief, which militates against a finding of attenuation.''): Green, 111 F.3d at
521 (.. only about five minutes elapsed betv\een the illegal stop of the Greens and the search of
the car. This weighs against finding the search attenuated."). Yet the State and the district court
believed that the relevant time period was the length of the unlmvful detention. Indeed, the
court found that "there was a minimal lapse of time between the seizure of the license and the
discovery a [sic] valid arrest warrant" (R .. p.66 ). and the State explained that .. if the Court
watches that video. the Court is going to probably want to rewind it because it goes by so
quickly. It's that quick. That plays in farnr of the State·' (5/6 14 Tr., p.40, Ls.1-3). As a result
of this misunderstanding, the district court not only failed to consider one of the three factors
used to determine whether the evidence is sufficiently attenuated to purge the taint of Officer
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Curtis's illegal actions, but also appears to have inappropriately considered the length of the
detention as an independent factor in the attenuation analysis. 3 This error alone requires remand.
What's more, the State failed to present any evidence on the relevant time period-from
\Vhen the Officer Curtis confirmed the warrants to when the officers discovered the evidence.
Officer Curtis only testified that '·Officer Otto assisted in getting [Mr. Cohagan's] left hand
behind his back. We handcuffed him up and took him into custody at that point."
Tr., p.19, Ls.20-22.)

(5/6/14

The court. apparently using a probable cause affidavit w-hich was not

introduced at the suppression hearing, filled in the gaps: "During the search incident to arrest,
officers discovered a yellow box containing a glass-smoking device with "" hite crystal residue
that tested positive for methamphetamine." (R .. p.64.) Presumably then, the officers discovered
the evidence relatively quickly, which vvould cut against the State. But regardless, the State
presented no evidence or argument on the first factor and thus did not and cannot meet its
burden. S'ee Cardenas, 143 Idaho at 908-09.

2.

The Purpose Of The Seizure And The Flagranc\ Of Officer Curtis's Actions Cuts
Against Attenuation

As an initial matter. the district court based its conclusion that the officers' actions were
not sufficiently flagrant on an erroneous factual finding. The district court found "the officers'

The Court of Appeals explained in Bifc;hwn: "'In a more typical attenuation case, a short lapse
of time between the unlawful conduct and tile discovery of the challengi:d evidence weighs
against a finding of attenuation. It appears that in Page, the Idaho Supreme Court noted the
minimal lapse of time as evidence of a lack of flagrant conduct by the officer because the period
of unlawful detention was short, and not as an application of the first factor of the three-factor
test." Bigham, 141 Idaho at 734 n.1. But because Page failed to mention the correct time
period-the lapse of time between the misconduct and the acquisition of evidence-in its
analysis, Mr. Cohagan believes it is more likely that Page simply overlooked the difference
between these two time periods. It would he odd for the Court to state the correct time period
when laying out the three-factor test, and then wholly ignore that factor in its analysis.
3
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conduct in the grocery store [was] unnecessary. but that '·Officer Curtis testified extensively that
the individual resembled another suspect[. Milo Morgan,] who ht knew had an outstanding arrest
warrant." (R., p.66.) Importantly. hov,:en~r. the district court overlooked that Officer Curtis
already kne,v that Mr. Cohagan was not the pi.:rson they were looking for when Officer Curtis
asked Mr. Cohagan for his license.

At the suppression hearing, Officer Curtis testified as

follov,s:
Q. Okay. So at what point as you are approaching Mr. Cohagan did you
realize that this was not Milo Morgan?
A. Probablv \\hen he gets fairh close to me. Again. the clothing and stuff
he was wearing, he had a hat on that \Yas pulled down over his head. Even the
way he \valked, looked a lot like the saunter of Milo Morgan.
.;

'--'

.,

L..

'--'

So as he got close, maybe 1{) or 15 feet away, I realized it was not
him, but at that point I still 1vanted to ask his name und ID him.
(5/6.114 Tr., p.28, Ls.2-12.) Therefore, Officer Curtis's initial belief that Mr. Cohagan was Milo
f\forgan is irrelevant to the analysis. Instead. the fact that Officer Curtis knew that Mr. Cohagan

v,:as not the suspect, but asked for his license and ran a \varrant check anyway, increases the
flagrancy of Officer Curtis's conduct.

The omission of this fact from the district court's

findings, and the district court's ultimate conclusion that Officer Curtis's testimony about Milo
Morgan somehow decreased the flagrancy of Officer Curtis's misconduct, shows that the district
court erroneously believed that Officer Curtis still thought Mr. Cohagan was Milo Morgan when
he asked for his license.

Because that oversight formed the primary basis of the court's

conclusion that Officer Curtis· s conduct \Vas not sufficiently flagrant, it warrants reversal.
Rather, the purpose and flagrancy of Officer Curtis's actions warrant suppressing the
evidence.

The officers stopped Mr. Cohagan not once, but twice. to confirm his identity.
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(R., p.63; see also State's Ex. 14: 5/6/14 Tr.) By the time Officer Curtis asked for Mr. Cohagan's
license, Officer Curtis had already realized that Mr. Cohagan was not the suspect but ·'still
wanted to ask his name and ID him."' (5/6i14 Tr., p.28, Ls.10-12.) The only possible reason for
doing that was to run a warrant check with l'vfr. Cohagan present-Officer Otto had already
determined Mr. Cohagan's license was valid and the Ofiicers already kne\V Mr. Cohagan's
name. (5/6/14 Tr., p.36, L.20 - p.37, L.l (defense counsel's argument).) ,\s the district court
observed, the officers could just have easily run a warrant check outside of the store rather than
returning for Mr. Cohagan's license and running a \Varrant check in his presence. (R., p.65.)
Instead, Officer Cmtis opted to ask for Mr. Cohagen's license then follow Mr. Cohagan through
the store \Vaiting to hear back from dispatch. (State's Ex. 1; see also 516114 Tr., p.14, L.22
p.17. L.19.) As the Court can see on the video. the officers tlwvarted Mr. Cohagan's attempt to
walk away from them by physically grabbing him and ordering him to .. relax:· (State ·s Ex. I;

see also 516114 Tr., p.16, L.21

p.17, L.2.) Officer Curtis also testified that Mr. Cohagan put his

hands in his pockets multiple times. '·which is just a common officer safety issue." (5/6/14
Tr., p.17, L.3

p.18, L.5.) After the warrants were confirmed and the three left the store, ·'the

video reveals yelling and an obvious struggle before the video shuts off.'' (R .. p.64.) As the
district court noted, the officers' decision to engage Mr. Cohagan inside the store. rather than
running the warTant check and waiting for !Vlr. Cohagan outside. needlessly put the safety of the
officers, Mr. Cohagan, and the public at risk. (R., p.65.)
This case goes beyond the factual situation alluded to in Bigham as being sufficiently
flagrant to undermine the discovery of an outstanding warrant. The Bigham Court noted that

The video of the incident is worth watching, as it captures the officers' tone of voice and their
physical contact with Mr. Cohagan.

4
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there ,vas ·'no evidence that [the officer] stopped Bigham solely to detenninc his identity so that
a vvarrant check could be run. Rather. [ the officer] conducted a warrant check only after he
recailed that Bigham's name was on a \Varrants list." Bigham, 141 Idaho 735. Here, Officer
Curtis did not merely ask for Mr. Cohagan's license so that he could figure out his name and run
a v,:arrant check. He in fact took it one step farther-Officer Curtis already knew Mr. Cohagan's
name, but still asked for and held on to Mr. Cohagan 's license v-:hile he ran a ,varrant check. The
second factor thus ·weighs heavily against attenuation-the officers detained Mr. Cohagan for a
patently illegal purpose, f1agrantly disregarded Mr. Cohagan· s Fourth Amendment rights. and
reckless! y put the public's safety at risk.
,,
.)

.

This Court's Holding In Page Does Not Dictate The Outcome Here

Page sets forth the rule this Court should apply, but the analysis and holding in Page do

not control.

See Bigham. 141 Idaho at 734 -35 ( citing Page for the proposition that "[t ]he

discovery of a warrant satisfies only the second prong by showing an intenening circumstance.
The other factors, particularly ·the flagrancy and purpose of the impropt..:r law enforcement
action.' must be weighed in every case to dt..:termine whether the taint of that misconduct is
sufficiently attenuated."). As discussed abow. Page's analysis is flawed because it considered
the wrong period of time for the first factor.

But, more importantly. the facts of this case

distinguish it from Page.
An officer smv Page walking dmvn tht..: center of the street around two in the morning.
Page, 140 Idaho at 842. Concerned for his well-being. the officer stopped to talk with Page, then

asked for his license. Id at 842-43. The officer told Page he was going to check his name with
the station to let him know who he had stopped, and then learned that Page had an outstanding
warrant. Id. at 843. The officer arrested Page and discovered drugs during a search incident to
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arrest Id There is no indication that the officer already knc,v Page's name but asked for his
license just so that he could keep Page there while he ran a warrant check. that Page tried to
leave at any point that the interaction turned physical, or that anyone else was put at risk. See
Par,e, 140 Idaho 841.
The Court found that Page v.:as unlmvfully detained when the officer took Page ·s license
to run a warrant check, but also found thm the seizure of the evidence against Page was
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal detention. Id. at 845--47. The Court noted:
[T]here was a minimal lapse of time between the seizure of the license and the
search pursuant to a valid arrest warrant The police officer's conduct was
certainly not flagrant, nor ,vas his purpose improper. Clearly, once the officer
discovered that there was an outstanding warrant, an intervening event under
Green, he did not have to release Page and was justified in arresting him at that
point.
Id. at 846--4 7.

Here, on the other hand. the officers· actions ,vere flagrant and their purpose was
improper. Officer Curtis already kne,\ Mr. Cohagan's name, but illegally detained Mr. Cohagan
anyvvay so that he could run a ,varrant check with Mr. Cohagan present ( 5/6;14 Tr., p.28, Ls. l 012); he tlnvarted :t\fr. Cohagan's attempt to go about his business at Albertson's (State's Ex. 1;
see also 5/6/14 Tr., p.14, L.22 - p.17, L.19). and he unnecessarily put the safety of the public and

Mr. Cohagan at risk (R., p.65). In other words, the officer in Page acted out of concern for
Page's well-being, while Officer Curtis sought to illegally detain Mr. Cohagan with the goal of
being able to lawfully arrest him on the spot. Considering these factual dit1erences, the outcome
in Page does not dictate the outcome here.
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4.

Taken Together. The First And Third Factors Tip The Balance Against
Attenuation

Even though the outstanding 'Warrant amounts to an intervening event the discovery of
the evidence in this case was a direct result of Officer Curtis's flagrant violation of
Mr. Cohagan's Fourth Amendment rights--an action Officer Curtis took in order to run a
\Varrant check \Vith Mr. Cohagan present. In other words, Officer Curtis "acquired the evidence
from ·exploitation of [the] illegality,"' not --·by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint..,. Bigham. 141 Idaho at 734 ( quoting Cireen, 111 F.3d at 520 and vVong
5i'un, 3 71 U.S. at 488).

The evidence seiz...:d is therefore not attenuated from the Fourth

Amendment violation-it is a direct consequence. This Court should suppress the evidence.

5.

The Deterrent Purpose Of The Exclusionary Rule Requires That This Court
Suppress the Evidence Against '.v1r. Cohmran

As explained in Green,
'·The [exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not tn repair. Its purpose is to
deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way--by removing the incentive to disregard it.'' Brovvn. 422 U.S. at
599-600. ·'Because the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to discourage
police misconduct, application of the rule does not serve this deterrent function
when the police action, although erroneous, \Vas not undertaken in an effort to
benefit the police at the expense of the suspect's protected rights." United
States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, 958 (7th Cir. 1990). This harkens back to Wong
Sun's question of whether the evidence comes to light '·by exploitation of that
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint.'· Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488.

Green, 111 F.3d at 523 (internal citations reformatted).

Similarly, "[i]n Page, the Idaho

Supreme Court expressed its disapproval of a rule that would allow law enforcement officers ·the
ability to initiate consensual encounters with pedestrians in order to seize identification and run a
warrants check."' Bigham, 141 Idaho at 735. n.2. (quoting Page, 140 Idaho at 845). That is
precisely what happened here. Officer Curtis detained Mr. Cohagan in an effort to benefit the
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police at the expense of Mr. Cohagan's protected rights. See Green, 111 F.3d at 523. Upholding
the district court's denial of Mr. Cohagan· s motion to suppress would send a clear message to
law enforcement in Idaho: The Fourth Amendment gives way as soon as an Idahoan voluntarily
hands mer his or her license. Such a message undercuts not just the purpos.: of the exclusionary
rule, but would also eviscerate the fundamental protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
This Court must suppress the evidence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Cohagan respectfully requests that the Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
reverse the order denying his motion to suppress.
DATED this 19th day of October, 2015.
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